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Non-technical summary 
Knowledge produced in the public sector has frequently been shown to be an 
important ingredient of economic growth and technological change. Most of the 
existing research puts emphasis on formal university technology transfer mechanisms 
(i.e. those that embody or directly lead to a legal instrument like a patent, license or 
royalty agreement). Few authors have investigated informal university technology 
transfer mechanisms. Informal technology transfer focuses primarily on interactions 
of the agents involved (i.e. on university scientists and industry personnel) where 
property rights are of secondary importance. While formal technology transfer 
mechanisms frequently aim at transferring a research result like a patent or a license 
to use a technology, informal mechanisms do not, and there is usually no expectation 
that they will. In this sense, formal technology transfer is a mechanism to allocate 
property rights whereas informal technology transfer is much more about 
communication among individuals. Examples could be contacts between academics 
and industry personnel at conferences, joint publications, academic consulting, or 
other informal contacts, talks and meetings. 
However, existing research shows that many university scientists in the United 
States do not disclose their inventions to their university although prescribed by law. 
University administrators will therefore have an interest to better understand the 
determinants of informal technology transfer given their objective to create revenues 
for the university. In the United States, the commercialization of technology 
developed by university scientists had been spurred by the enactment of the Bayh-
Dole Act in 1980. In Germany, an equivalent to the Bayh-Dole Act only came into 
force 20 years later in 2002. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to shed light on the 
effects that institutional differences might have on the choice of scientists to transfer 
technology informally. We present comparative findings for Germany based on a 
recent paper by Link et al. (2007) which has focused on the United States. Moreover, 
we extend their previous findings by focusing on two neglected factors more 
explicitly: the scientist’s individual productivity as well as the research environment 
in which the informal technology transfer takes place.  
Based on a comprehensive sample of more than 800 German university scientists, 
our U.S.-German comparison reveals similar behavior of university scientists; faculty 
quality matters considerably for increasing the propensity to engage in informal 
technology transfer activities. However, scientists signal their quality to industry 
predominantly by having a track record of patent applications. Scientific publications 
seem to be less important. The lesson learned is simple; faculty, like all economic 
agents, respond to incentives and until universities change their incentives (e.g., 
patenting as one criterion for promotion and tenure) knowledge will continue to flow 
out the backdoor. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Wissen, das von Universitäten und außeruniversitären Forschungseinrichtungen 
generiert wird, trägt in vielerlei Hinsicht zu Wachstum und technologischem Wandel 
bei. Forschungsarbeiten, die sich mit der Frage nach dem effizienten Transfer von 
Forschungsergebnissen aus der öffentlichen Forschung zu Unternehmen beschäftigen, 
fokussieren dabei insbesondere auf formelle Mechanismen des Technologietransfers, 
das heißt solche, bei denen ein Patent oder eine Lizenz erworben werden. Nur wenige 
Autoren haben sich bislang mit informellen Mechanismen des Technologietransfers 
beschäftigt. Informeller Technologietransfer bezieht sich dabei im Wesentlichen auf 
die Interaktionen der mit ihm befassten Agenten, das heißt der 
Hochschulwissenschaftler und des Personals in Unternehmen. Geht es im Fall von 
formellem Technologietransfer in der Regel darum, ein Patent oder eine Lizenz zur 
Nutzung einer bestimmten Technologie zu transferieren, besteht diese Erwartung im 
Fall des informellen Technologietransfers nicht. Vielmehr geht es um einen 
Austausch auf informeller Ebene, beispielsweise durch Kontakte auf Konferenzen, 
gemeinsame Publikationen, Beratung oder andere informelle Kontakte, Gespräche 
und Treffen. 
Bisherige Studien haben jedoch gezeigt, dass viele Hochschulwissenschaftler in den 
USA ihrer Universität keinen Zugriff auf ihre Erfindungen gewähren, obwohl sie 
rechtlich dazu verpflichtet wären. Dies regelt seit dem Jahr 1980 der Bayh-Dole-Act, 
während in Deutschland das sogenannte Hochschullehrerprivileg erst im Jahre 2002 
wegfiel und nun auch in Deutschland Hochschulangehörige die Eigentums- und 
Verwertungsrechte an Erfindungen ihrer Einrichtung – wenn auch gegen Entgelt – 
abtreten müssen. Unter der Annahme, dass Hochschulen sowohl diesseits als auch 
jenseits des Atlantik ein Interesse daran haben, Einkünfte aus der erfinderischen 
Tätigkeit ihrer Angestellten zu erzielen, verfolgt der vorliegende Beitrag das Ziel, 
einen genaueren Blick auf die institutionellen Unterschiede zwischen den USA und 
Deutschland zu werfen, um gegebenenfalls Unterschiede in der Neigung von 
Hochschulwissenschaftlern zu identifizieren, ihr Wissen auf informellem Wege an 
Unternehmen zu transferieren. Unser Beitrag baut dabei auf einer neueren Studie von 
Link et al. (2007) auf, die das (informelle) Technologietransferverhalten von 
Wissenschaftlern in den USA untersuchen. Darüber hinaus untersuchen wir den 
Einfluss der Produktivität von Wissenschaftlern und des institutionellen Umfelds. 
Basierend auf einer Stichprobe von über 800 deutschen Wissenschaftlern zeigen 
unsere Ergebnisse ähnliche Zusammenhänge wie in den USA: Die Produktivität der 
Wissenschaftler ist wesentlicher Erklärungsfaktor, allerdings zählen dabei vor allem 
Patentanmeldungen im Gegensatz zu Publikationen. Daraus ergibt sich, dass 
Hochschulwissenschaftler, wie alle ökonomisch handelnden Akteure, auf Anreize 
reagieren. Solange Universitäten daher nicht ihre Anreizstrukturen ändern, wird 
technologisches Wissen die Universität weiterhin „durch die Hintertür“ verlassen. 
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I. Introduction 
Knowledge produced in the public sector has frequently been shown to be an important 
ingredient of economic growth and technological change (Jaffe, 1989; Adams, 1990; Link and 
Siegel, 2007). In this respect, patterns of evidence for university technology transfer focus on 
the institutions (e.g. technology transfer offices), the agents involved in technology 
commercialization, academic spin-offs, university-industry cooperative research centers or 
science parks and incubators (Bozeman, 2000; Aerts et al., 2007; Rothaermel et al., 2007). 
Most of the existing research puts emphasis on formal university technology transfer 
mechanisms (i.e. those that embody or directly lead to a legal instrument like a patent, license 
or royalty agreement (Bozeman, 2000; Feldman et al., 2002; Thursby and Thursby, 2002; 
Siegel and Phan, 2005). Few authors have investigated informal university technology 
transfer mechanisms (e.g. Link et al., 2007). Informal technology transfer focuses primarily 
on interactions of the agents involved (i.e. on university scientists and industry personnel) 
where property rights are of secondary importance.2 Link et al. (2007) conceive informal 
technology transfer as a mechanism through which technology knowledge flows between the 
agents, for example by technical assistance or consulting. While formal technology transfer 
mechanisms frequently aim at transferring a research result like a patent or a license to use a 
technology, informal mechanisms do not, and there is usually no expectation that they will. In 
this sense, formal technology transfer is seen as a mechanism to allocate property rights 
whereas informal technology transfer is much more about informal communication processes. 
Examples could be contacts between academics and industry personnel at conferences, joint 
publications, academic consulting, or other informal contacts, talks and meetings. 
However, Siegel et al. (2003) and Thursby et al. (2007) find that many university scientists 
in the United States do not disclose their inventions to their university although prescribed by 
law. And even if university inventions are publicly disclosed some firms will try to approach 
scientists and arrange to work with them directly (Hall et al., 2003). Hence, informal 
technology transfer seems to be a dominant mode of collaboration. Link et al. (2007) find that 
52 percent of the scientists they addressed through the Research Value Mapping Program 
Survey of Academic Researchers had some kind of working relationship with industry 
personnel. Formal and informal technology transfer cannot always be easily isolated from 
each other as collaborative research or consulting could comprise patents being transferred 
from university to industry. In fact, existing literature suggests that formal and informal 
technology transfer may go well together (Siegel et al., 2003; Link et al., 2007) in that 
informal contacts improve the quality of a formal relationship or that formal contracts are 
accompanied by an informal relation of mutual exchange on technology-related aspects. 
Grimpe and Hussinger (2008) find that both channels are complementary (i.e. using one 
channel of collaboration if the other one is in place has a higher incremental impact on the 
innovation performance of firms than using one of the two channels more intense in 
                                                 
2  In the following, we will use the term ‘university scientist’ as shorthand for scientists employed at 
universities or other public research institutes. 
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isolation). It is therefore not surprising that formal and informal technology transfer may 
occur simultaneously (Perkmann and Walsh, 2007) and that firms have an interest to make 
use of both. 
Taking these findings together suggests that university administrators will have an interest 
to better understand the determinants of informal technology transfer given their objective to 
create revenues for the university. In the United States, the commercialization of technology 
developed by university scientists had been spurred by the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act in 
1980. In other countries like Germany, an equivalent to the Bayh-Dole Act only came into 
force 20 years later in 2002. The scientists’ right to commercialize inventions privately before 
2002 is still reflected by a rather low number of German university patents (Czarnitzki et al., 
2007; Czarnitzki et al., 2008) and few licensing agreements (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008) 
compared to the United States. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to shed light on the effects 
that institutional differences might have on the choice of scientists to transfer technology 
informally. We present comparative findings for Germany by using the approach of Link et 
al. (2007). Moreover, we extend their previous findings by focusing on two neglected factors 
more explicitly: the scientist’s individual productivity as well as the research environment in 
which the informal technology transfer takes place. Using a comprehensive sample of more 
than 800 German university scientists, we explore the determinants of informal technology 
transfer and derive implications for university administrators and policy makers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section first provides a brief 
review of the literature on university technology transfer. We then describe the results of the 
pioneering study on informal technology transfer in the United States (Link et al., 2007) and 
outline what might be expected in the German context. Section 3 explains our empirical 
methods before the subsequent section will show the results. We conclude the paper with a 
brief summary statement. 
II. Literature background and theoretical considerations 
Literature has identified two major sources of motivation for university scientists: The first 
has been described as recognition within the academic community. Recognition can most 
prominently be achieved through publications, patent applications, presentations and the 
awarding of research grants. As tenure decisions and promotions are primarily a function of 
recognition in its various forms, untenured faculty members will have strong incentives to 
pursue these objectives. Second, faculty members may also be motivated by the opportunity 
to acquire additional resources, resulting either in personal financial gain or in funding 
available for a build-up of physical and human capital at the scientist’s institution (Link et al., 
2007). Analyzing the effectiveness of university technology transfer offices (TTOs) which 
were created mainly as a consequence of the Bayh-Dole Act assigning the rights on faculty 
inventions to the university, Siegel et al. (2003) and Siegel et al. (2004) find, however, that 
these TTOs provide little incentives for faculty involvement. In other words, university TTOs 
loose opportunities for technology commercialization due to a perceived unfavorable royalty 
distribution to the scientist. In fact, simply increasing the returns to faculty members seems to 
make the commercialization process more effective (Friedman and Silberman, 2003; Lach 
and Schankerman, 2004; Link and Siegel, 2005). However, significant difficulties in 
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negotiating and transacting with the TTO remain (Link and Siegel, 2005) which suggests that 
university scientists may have strong incentives to informally transfer their research results 
instead of choosing the route through the TTO. 
Link et al. (2007) have been the first to shed further light on the decision of academics to 
engage in informal technology transfer. Their results for the United States are based on the 
Research Value Mapping Program Survey of Academic Researchers for which a sample of 
university scientists and engineers with a Ph.D. at the 150 Carnegie Extensive 
Doctoral/Research Universities during the time period spring 2004 to spring 2005 was 
collected. Link et al. (2007) distinguish between three mechanism through which informal 
technology transfer may occur: commercializing technology through direct collaboration with 
industry personnel, joint publication with industry personnel, and serving as a formally paid 
consultant to an industrial firm. They link these choices to a number of variables depicting 
faculty characteristics, including gender, tenure/years with tenure, age, and the percent of time 
spent on grants-related research. While gender serves as a control variable, the tenure 
variables are intended to measure faculty quality in terms of received recognition and research 
success. These measures are based on the argument that tenure serves as a signal and that 
more credentialed faculty will also be in higher demand by industry (Murray, 2004). Age is 
included to disentangle the effects from tenure as a signal of faculty quality and the time 
necessary to build up relationships with industry. The percent of time allocated to grants-
related research serves as another proxy for human capital as the awarding of grants involves 
a review process by an external organization, and only the most promising grant applications 
will presumably be likely to pass this hurdle. Finally, academic disciplines control for 
different technological and hence transfer opportunities. 
Their results show that 52 percent of the scientists had some kind of working relationship 
with industry personnel, including most prominently consulting (18 percent), joint 
commercialization of technology (15.8 percent) and joint publication activities (14.6 percent). 
Regarding their faculty quality indicators they show that tenured academics are more likely 
than untenured academics to engage in all three informal technology transfer activities. 
Consistent with this finding, the number of years with tenure as an alternative measure 
increases the propensity for informal technology transfer. Moreover, they observe the same 
effect for the percentage of time spent on grants-related research. Regarding the gender, male 
faculty members are found to be more likely to transfer technology informally than female 
faculty members. Although Link et al. (2007) control for disciplinary effects, they argue that 
gender effects might also be explained by disciplinary selection in that women are typically 
less represented in disciplines most active in technology transfer. Regarding the scientist’s 
age, they find that younger academics are more likely to engage in joint commercialization of 
technology. There is no effect on the other two forms of informal technology transfer. In sum, 
the results by Link et al. (2007) provide first insights into the decision of academics to engage 
in informal technology transfer. There are, however, a number of reasons which suggest that 
results on the propensity to engage in informal technology transfer could be different in 
different institutional contexts. In the following, we will thus provide arguments that point to 
the differences between the United States and Germany with a possible influence on the 
academic’s choice for engaging in informal technology transfer. 
4 
Differences can, first of all, be attributed to the existence of the Bayh-Dole-Act in the 
United States since 1980. In Germany, the ‘professor’s privilege’ (‘Hochschullehrer-Privileg’) 
was in place until 2002. Based on Article 5 of the German constitution, which focuses on the 
freedom of science and research, the professor’s privilege entitled academics in Germany to 
use their scientific results for private commercialization even if the underlying research was 
carried out at and financed by the university or other public sources (Kilger and Bartenbach, 
2002). In fact, the professors’ right to commercialize inventions privately before that year is 
reflected by a low number of German university patents (Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Czarnitzki et 
al., 2008). Moreover, university licensing which is receiving much attention in the literature 
on industry-science links is used by relatively few German firms (Grimpe and Hussinger, 
2008). Instead, consulting and informal collaboration have been shown to be substantial. 
Although several years have passed since the abolishment of the professor’s privilege in 
Germany, we can expect these patterns to persist, particularly because most German 
universities are still in the process to set up an effective technology transfer infrastructure. As 
a consequence, university scientists in Germany, and especially highly credentialed faculty 
members, should be more likely to engage in informal technology transfer than their U.S. 
counterparts. 
Second, differences between the United States and Germany could arise from different work 
contracts. While U.S. faculty members receive their pay typically only for nine months of the 
year, German academics are paid for twelve months. The missing three months could in turn 
motivate U.S. faculty to seek other income opportunities and to engage in informal 
technology transfer. Moreover, U.S. faculty might be under higher pressure than their German 
colleagues to acquire research money to support ongoing projects and junior staff. 
Third, we may assume that the specific German orientation towards excellence in 
engineering plays a role for the informal technology transfer behavior. Several German 
universities have a long-standing tradition and reputation in the field of engineering. 
Engineering research is organized in large research groups, with multi-million research 
funding and close collaboration with industry. Moreover, engineers in Germany are typically 
member of the German engineers association (‘VDI – Verein Deutscher Ingenieure’). Both 
the bonds through their alma mater and the network provided by the engineering association 
should therefore facilitate informal technology transfer activities. As a result, we should be 
able to observe strong positive effects particularly from scientists in engineering disciplines. 
Besides the alleged differences between the United States and Germany, our research also 
aims at extending the findings of Link et al. (2007) by focusing more in detail on the faculty 
quality dimension as well as on the scientist’s research environment. While the faculty quality 
indicators used by Link et al. (2007) are presumably correlated with individual productivity, 
they do not account for the different facets of productivity upon which tenure and grant award 
decisions are typically based. We have outlined above that academic prestige serves as a 
signal to potential commercialization partners in industry. Prestige can in turn be built up 
through publications or patents. Recent studies for the United States and Germany show that 
publications and university patenting are positively linked (e.g., Agrawal and Henderson, 
2002; Stephan et al., 2006; Czarnitzki et al., 2009). As a consequence, we will include direct 
measures of the publication and patenting activities of scientists and relate them to their 
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informal technology transfer behavior. More specifically, we expect positive effects from 
publications on the decision to jointly publish with industry personnel and from patents on the 
informal commercialization of technology. Regarding consulting, we expect positive effects 
from both publications and patenting. 
Besides research productivity, tenure and the awarding of grants, there is another aspect of 
faculty quality that has been neglected so far, i.e. whether the scientist is a research group 
leader. Obviously, leading a research group should be associated with some academic prestige 
developed through publications or patents. Moreover, being a research group leader should 
lead to a multitude of contacts with industry personnel at various occasions. Assuming that 
the group leader’s recognition increases with group size, there should be an incentive to 
engage in informal technology transfer and acquire research money to support the group. 
Effects should be particularly pronounced for the decision to commercialize technology and 
to serve as a paid consultant as these forms of technology transfer could serve as a mechanism 
to raise funding. 
As a final extension to the model by Link et al. (2007) we suggest that the scientist’s 
research environment matters for the decision to transfer technology informally. In this 
context, Etzkowitz (2003) has put forward the notion of research groups as ‘quasi-firms’ in 
entrepreneurial universities. Provided that research funding is awarded on a competitive basis, 
research groups will presumably exhibit firm-like qualities. In the following, we will focus on 
one aspect of the research environment which is the size of the peer group at the scientist’s 
institution. On the one hand, the more people are working on similar topics the more internal 
opportunities for collaboration arise. On the other hand, competitive pressure for research 
money will also be higher which is why we expect academics to be more likely to engage in 
informal technology transfer. 
III. Data and econometric model 
The data used in our empirical analysis stem from a survey among German scientists which 
was carried out on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The 
aim of the survey, which was part of an evaluation project of the 6th European Union 
Research Framework Program, was to get an overview of university scientists’ efforts to 
acquire research grants from various sources. Data were collected in 2008 using an online 
survey instrument. On the one hand, contacting respondents via e-mail involves the risk of not 
reaching a considerable number of persons due to outdated or misspelled e-mail addresses. On 
the other hand, e-mails have the advantage to be independent from space (i.e. the e-mail will 
reach the scientist although she or he might be away from the home office). Two major data 
sources were used for the sampling procedure. In a first step, the population of scientists 
employed at German universities was derived from the ‘Hochschullehrerverzeichnis’ from the 
year 2006. The ‘Hochschullehrerverzeichnis’ is a database containing the names, degrees and 
contact information of the academic personnel holding a PhD and being employed at German 
universities.3 In a second step, scientists at government-funded public research institutes were 
                                                 
3  This excludes the so-called ‘universities of applied sciences’ whose major task is teaching and not research. 
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identified via an internet search of the institutes’ websites. These research institutes belong to 
one of the four large German science organizations: Max Planck Society, Fraunhofer Society, 
Leibniz Association and Helmholtz Association. In total, 20,519 scientists with available e-
mail addresses were identified. For 4,250 scientists, delivery of the message failed because of 
a wrong e-mail address. We obtained 2,797 responses, a response rate on the net sample of 
17.2 percent which can be regarded as satisfactory for such a large-scale online survey. Due to 
missing values for some variables the actual number of observations available for analysis is, 
however, lower.  
The measures of informal technology transfer and the explanatory variables are based on 
faculty responses. To achieve comparability, we used exactly the same questions as in the 
Research Value Mapping Program Survey of Academic Researchers (Link et al., 2007). For 
our dependent variables relating to alternative mechanisms of informal technology transfer, 
scientists were asked to respond to these statements in the survey: 
During the past 12 months: 
 I worked directly with industry personnel in an effort to transfer or commercialize 
technology or applied research. 
 I co-authored a paper with industry personnel that has been published in a journal 
or refereed proceedings. 
 I served as a formal paid consultant to an industrial firm. 
We estimate several probit models and regress the three choices to transfer technology 
informally on different sets of explanatory variables. The first set is intended to exactly 
replicate the analysis by Link et al. (2007) for Germany, thus including faculty characteristics 
like gender (males=1, 0 otherwise), tenure (tenured=1, 0 otherwise), age (in logs)4, pre-
eminence of the faculty member, as measured by the percent of time spent on grants-related 
research, and dummies for the scientific disciplines (social sciences and humanities, life 
sciences, other natural sciences, engineering sciences, with social sciences and humanities 
being the reference case). As an alternative specification, we include a scientist’s number of 
years with tenure (in logs), leaving tenure and age out of the model due to high correlation. 
The second set of variables is our extension to the model used by Link et al. (2007). The 
survey of German scientists provides more in-depth information about the scientist’s 
productivity and the institutional environment in which the research activities are carried out. 
Scientists were asked whether they are leading a research group (leader=1, 0 otherwise) and 
how many publications in refereed journals and patent applications they were able to achieve 
in the period from 2002 to 2006 (each entered in logs). To control for the research 
environment and, more specifically for the size of the peer group, scientists were asked how 
many colleagues they have at their institution working on similar research topics (in logs). 
                                                 
4  For all variables which enter the regression in logs, a value of 0 was replaced by 0.1 to prevent missing 
values due to the log transformation. 
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IV. Results 
Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics (Table 1) show that almost half of the surveyed scientists worked 
together with industry personnel in an effort to commercialize technology. Slightly more than 
20 percent of the scientists exhibit at least one joint publication with industry personnel. 
Around 17 percent of the scientists served as a formally paid consultant to a firm. Regarding 
the faculty characteristics we find that the majority of the surveyed scientists are male (86 
percent) with an average age 49 years. A high share of the scientists in our sample is tenured 
(83 percent) and on average the scientists have been tenured since 12 years. Further, the 
surveyed researchers spent about one third of the time on grants-related research. Regarding 
the scientific disciplines, our sample is rather evenly split between the four categories. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Commercialize technology 945 0.438 0.496 0 1 
Joint publication 938 0.230 0.421 0 1 
Consulting 925 0.172 0.377 0 1 
Gender  943 0.856 0.351 0 1 
Tenure  926 0.828 0.377 0 1 
Percent time spent on grants-related research 880 32.378 22.867 0 100 
Age 948 49.283 8.371 28 70 
Years with tenure 745 11.913 8.391 1 43 
Social sciences and humanities 929 0.212 0.409 0 1 
Life sciences  929 0.284 0.451 0 1 
Other natural sciences  929 0.302 0.460 0 1 
Engineering sciences  929 0.201 0.401 0 1 
Research group leader  928 0.706 0.456 0 1 
No of publications 948 20.638 26.440 0 200 
No of patent applications 948 0.714 1.927 0 24 
Size of the peer group at the scientist’s institution 948 30.324 76.077 0 1000 
Sample restricted to scientists with non-missing values for at least one informal technology transfer channel. 
 
If we compare the descriptive statistics for the sample of German scientists with the 
descriptive statistics of the sample used by Link et al. (2007) we can observe considerable 
differences. Apparently, German scientists are more active in commercializing technology 
than their U.S. colleagues but somewhat less active in joint publication and consulting 
activities. At the same time the U.S. sample is more balanced regarding the gender of the 
scientists compared to the sample of the German scientists which results from gender 
stratification. The descriptive statistics for the additional variables which were not available in 
the U.S. sample show that about 70 percent of the scientists in our sample stated that they 
were research group leaders at the time when the survey was conducted. The productivity 
variables reveal that the surveyed scientists published around 20 articles in refereed journals 
within a five year period and on average applied for 0.7 patents during the years 2002 to 2006. 
Finally the variable that controls for the size of the peer group shows that on average the size 
of the peer group at the scientist’s institution is about 30 scientists. 
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Probit regressions 
Table 2 presents the results of probit regression models. For each of the three dependent 
variables four different model specifications are estimated. Models (1) and (2) for each 
dependent variable show the results of the basic model following the empirical approach of 
Link et al. (2007). In Model (1) we include the tenure dummy and age while the years with 
tenure are omitted due to high correlation with age. Model (2) substitutes age by years with 
tenure. Models (3) and (4) show the same specification as (1) and (2) but they are extended by 
the additional variables on productivity and research environment discussed before.  
Regarding gender, Link et al. (2007) find that male academics are more likely to engage in 
informal technology transfer, specifically in the commercialization of technology and 
consulting activities. We are able to confirm this finding for the German data. It is particularly 
pronounced for consulting activities where the coefficient is highly significant. Moreover, we 
can largely confirm the positive effects from tenure on the likelihood to engage in technology 
commercialization and joint publication. Model (2) however shows that the number of years 
with tenure does not have any effect on informal technology transfer which is in stark contrast 
to the findings by Link et al. (2007). Similarly, age turns out to have no effect at all which is 
in concordance with the findings from the United States. We can again confirm the U.S. 
findings regarding the share of time spent on grants-related research. In both datasets, the 
effect is positive and significant for all three forms of informal technology transfer. To sum 
up, our findings for the German scientists largely confirm the results obtained by Link et al. 
(2007). Apart from differences in the descriptive statistics regarding the actual engagement in 
the three forms of informal technology transfer, the relationships between the assumed driving 
factors are similar, despite the institutional differences between the United States and 
Germany. 
While in the U.S. study discipline effects were held constant and results weighted by 
discipline sampling proportions, the models using the German dataset include dummy 
variables to capture discipline effects.5 This enables us to consider disciplinary effects more 
explicitly. Generally speaking, all three included disciplines are more likely to engage in 
informal technology transfer compared to the reference group of social sciences and 
humanities which is anything but surprising. Particularly engineering scientists are very likely 
to engage in all three forms of informal technology transfer, suggesting that there are indeed 
strong informal ties between academics and industry personnel, for example through the 
German engineers association. There is no effect on consulting for other natural scientists. 
Turning to the extension of the baseline models, we find several interesting effects. 
Apparently, being a research group leader matters considerably for technology 
commercialization and consulting but not for joint publication. This finding confirms our 
                                                 
5  The reason for this is that sampling proportions by field could not be taken into account as – due to the 
inclusion of government-funded research institutes – the population of scientists in Germany with regard to 
the field is not fully transparent. In Germany, a significant share of the engineering related research activities 
are performed by the Fraunhofer institutes in comparison to universities. The same applies to life sciences 
research which is to a significant extent performed at Max Planck institutes. 
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theoretical reasoning that research group leaders have a higher incentive to acquire research 
money in order to finance their group. In this light, joint publication activities seem 
inappropriate. Moreover, research group leaders are often caught in administrative business 
and therefore often do not find the time to conduct research and publish the results. Our 
measure for the research environment (i.e. the size of the peer group) turns out to be 
marginally positively related to technology commercialization and negatively to consulting. 
We expected a positive sign throughout due to the argument that research funding is awarded 
on a competitive basis and the size of the peer group should positively influence the level of 
competition for funds. We may speculate that the negative sign for consulting hints at a 
different kind of peer pressure not to engage too intensively in activities that do not primarily 
benefit the university or research institute but rather the private remuneration.  
Finally, focusing on the research productivity indicators publications and patent applications 
we find that the number of publications is not important at all for the decision to engage in 
any form of informal technology transfer. Instead, patent applications have a consistently 
positive and significant effect. Obviously, scientists succeed in signalling their quality to 
industry not by publications which would rather contribute to academic merits but by patents. 
Firms seem to acknowledge the practice-oriented work of the scientists that may be 
immediately integrated into the firm’s knowledge base. In this respect, our results are in 
contrast to previous findings for the biotechnology industry showing that university “star” 
scientists, measured in terms of publication activity, are attractive partners for firm scientists 
to collaborate with (e.g., Zucker and Darby, 1996; Zucker et al., 2002). Hence, this argument 
seems to hold true only in the specific disciplinary setting of biotechnology while it 
disappears when scientists from various disciplines are considered. 
Comparing the baseline models (1) and (2) with our extended models (3) and (4) shows that 
the positive tenure effect as a proxy for faculty quality observed both in the U.S. and German 
data is partly taken over by the patent and research group leader variables. Faculty quality 
hence seems to be a multifaceted construct on which the added variables were able to shed 
some more light. 
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Table 2: Probit results 
 Commercialize technology Joint publication Consulting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gender  0.231* 0.203 0.155 0.146 0.298* 0.222 0.213 0.135 0.632*** 0.782*** 0.647*** 0.819*** 
 (0.137) (0.162) (0.144) (0.171) (0.170) (0.195) (0.177) (0.203) (0.194) (0.245) (0.200) (0.254) 
Tenure  0.349**  0.214  0.394**  0.299*  0.087  -0.027  
 (0.144)  (0.155)  (0.168)  (0.177)  (0.171)  (0.179)  
Years with tenure (in logs)  -0.02  -0.013  0.001  0.021  0.047  0.076 
  (0.065)  (0.068)  (0.071)  (0.074)  (0.077)  (0.080) 
Percent time grants-related  0.005** 0.005* 0.005** 0.004 0.005** 0.006** 0.005* 0.006* 0.004 0.005 0.004* 0.006* 
research (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age (in logs) 0.038  -0.018  0.217  0.098  0.379  0.266  
 (0.310)  (0.332)  (0.337)  (0.353)  (0.358)  (0.367)  
Life sciences  0.472*** 0.474*** 0.211 0.211 0.389** 0.483** 0.128 0.227 0.469*** 0.558*** 0.406** 0.499** 
 (0.135) (0.153) (0.152) (0.171) (0.169) (0.195) (0.187) (0.215) (0.162) (0.187) (0.178) (0.207) 
Other natural sciences  0.287** 0.233 0.147 0.074 0.514*** 0.597*** 0.360** 0.451** -0.13 -0.131 -0.143 -0.134 
 (0.133) (0.148) (0.146) (0.162) (0.163) (0.186) (0.177) (0.202) (0.172) (0.193) (0.183) (0.210) 
Engineering sciences  1.365*** 1.372*** 1.007*** 1.009*** 1.123*** 1.253*** 0.897*** 1.060*** 0.585*** 0.611*** 0.478*** 0.549*** 
 (0.155) (0.169) (0.164) (0.179) (0.172) (0.193) (0.184) (0.205) (0.171) (0.191) (0.182) (0.204) 
Research group leader    0.415*** 0.378***   0.138 0.203   0.403*** 0.440*** 
   (0.118) (0.133)   (0.131) (0.149)   (0.145) (0.170) 
Size of the peer group at the   0.048 0.066*   -0.045 -0.049   -0.093** -0.134*** 
scientist’s institution (in logs)   (0.036) (0.040)   (0.040) (0.044)   (0.043) (0.048) 
No of publications (in logs)   -0.096** -0.069   0.069 0.076   -0.036 0.004 
   (0.043) (0.047)   (0.047) (0.050)   (0.049) (0.054) 
No of patent applications    0.795*** 0.733***   0.521*** 0.488***   0.304*** 0.274*** 
(in logs)   (0.101) (0.108)   (0.084) (0.090)   (0.087) (0.094) 
Constant  -1.443 -0.863*** -1.239 -1.091*** -2.903** -1.719*** -2.454* -1.926*** -3.428** -2.168*** -2.975** -2.400*** 
 (1.162) (0.235) (1.250) (0.271) (1.269) (0.291) (1.333) (0.323) (1.357) (0.341) (1.397) (0.381) 
Pseudo R2  0.115 0.114 0.195 0.188 0.095 0.095 0.149 0.153 0.069 0.077 0.104 0.118 
N  835 668 821 657 828 661 814 650 821 655 808 645 
LR Chi2  131.399 104.918 219.089 170.786 84.423 70.369 129.368 110.718 52.072 47.992 77.657 72.903 
P-value  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Social sciences and humanities serve as reference group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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V. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to shed light on the effects that institutional differences have 
on the choice of scientists to transfer technology informally. Our comparison of results for the 
United States and for Germany reveals similar behavior of faculty. Focusing in more detail on 
the research productivity of faculty in terms of publications and patents our results show that 
particularly university scientists with a track record of patent applications are an attractive 
partner for firm scientists in joint informal technology transfer activities. 
The lesson learned from our research is simple; faculty, like all economic agents, respond to 
incentives and until universities change their incentives (e.g., patenting as one criterion for 
promotion and tenure) knowledge will continue to flow out the backdoor.  
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Appendix 
Table 3: Correlations 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
1. Gender  1.000  
2. Tenure  0.167 1.000  
3. Percent time spent on grants-related research -0.021 -0.237 1.000  
4. Age (in logs) 0.121 0.479 -0.171 1.000 
5. Life sciences  -0.116 -0.080 0.075 0.034 1.000
6. Other natural sciences  0.106 0.009 -0.027 -0.022 -0.424 1.000
7. Engineering sciences  0.121 0.120 0.090 0.002 -0.310 -0.339 1.000
8. Research group leader  0.092 0.239 -0.016 0.152 0.073 -0.052 0.015 1.000
9. No of publications (in logs) 0.131 0.039 0.020 0.057 0.238 0.175 -0.245 0.294 1.000
10. No of patent applications (in logs) 0.097 0.081 0.064 0.067 0.072 -0.048 0.221 0.147 0.128 1.000
11. Size of the peer group at the scientist’s institution (in logs) 0.121 -0.034 0.120 -0.091 0.074 0.089 0.047 0.030 0.078 0.155 1.000
Variance inflation factor (mean=1.42) 1.11 1.45 1.11 1.34 2.00 1.99 1.85 1.19 1.34 1.15 1.10
Sample restricted to scientists with non-missing values for at least one informal technology transfer channel. 
 
 
 
13 
References 
Adams, J.D. (1990), Fundamental Stocks of Knowledge and Productivity Growth, Journal of 
Political Economy 98, 673-702. 
Aerts, K., P. Matthyssens and K. Vandenbempt (2007), Critical Role and Screening Practices 
of European Business Incubators, Technovation 27, 254-267. 
Agrawal, A. and R. Henderson (2002), Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge 
Transfer from Mit, Management Science 48 (1), 44-60. 
Bozeman, B. (2000), Technology Transfer and Public Policy: A Review of Research and 
Theory, Research Policy 29, 627-655. 
Czarnitzki, D., W. Glänzel and K. Hussinger (2007), Patent and Publication Activities of 
German Professors: An Empirical Assessment of Their Co-Activity, Research 
Evaluation 16 (4), 311-319. 
Czarnitzki, D., W. Glänzel and K. Hussinger (2009), Heterogeneity of Patenting Activity and 
its Implications for Scientific Research, Research Policy 38, 26-34. 
Czarnitzki, D., K. Hussinger and C. Schneider (2008), Commercializing Academic Research: 
The Quality of Faculty Patenting, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 08-069, Mannheim. 
Etzkowitz, H. (2003), Research Groups as 'Quasi-Firms': The Invention of the Entrepreneurial 
University, Resarch Policy 32, 109-121. 
Feldman, M.P., I. Feller, J. Bercovitz and R. Burton (2002), Equity and the Technology 
Transfer Strategies of American Research Universities, Management Science 48, 105-
121. 
Friedman, J. and J. Silberman (2003), University Technology Transfer: Do Incentives, 
Management, and Location Matter?, Journal of Technology Transfer 28, 81-85. 
Grimpe, C. and K. Hussinger (2008), Formal and Informal Technology Transfer from 
Academia to Industry: Complementarity Effects and Innovation Performance, ZEW 
Discussion Paper No. 08-080, Mannheim. 
Hall, B.H., A.N. Link and J.T. Scott (2003), Universities as Research Partners, Journal of 
Economic Studies 85, 485-491. 
Jaffe, A. (1989), The Real Effects of Academic Research, American Economic Review 97 (5), 
957-970. 
Kilger, C. and K. Bartenbach (2002), New Rules for German Professors, Science 298 (8), 
1173-1175. 
Lach, S. and M. Schankerman (2004), Royalty Sharing and Technology Licensing in 
Universities, Journal of the European Economic Association 2, 252-264. 
Link, A.N. and D.S. Siegel (2007), Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Technological Change, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Link, A.N. and D.S. Siegel (2005), Generating Science-Based Growth: An Econometric 
Analysis of the Impact of Organizational Incentives on University–Industry 
Technology Transfer, European Journal of Finance 11, 169-182. 
Link, A.N., D.S. Siegel and B. Bozeman (2007), An Empirical Analysis of the Propensity of 
Academics to Engage in Informal University Technology Transfer, Industrial & 
Corporate Change 16 (4), 641-655. 
Murray, F. (2004), The Role of Academic Inventors in Entrepreneurial Firms: Sharing the 
Laboratory Life, Research Policy 33, 643-659. 
Perkmann, M. and K. Walsh (2007), University-Industry Relationships and Open Innovation: 
Towards a Research Agenda, International Journal of Management Reviews 9 (4), 
259-280. 
14 
Rothaermel, F.T., S.D. Agung and L. Jiang (2007), University Entrepreneurship: A 
Taxonomy of the Literature, Industrial & Corporate Change 16 (4), 691-791. 
Siegel, D.S. and P. Phan (2005), Analyzing the Effectiveness of University Technology 
Transfer: Implications for Entrepreneurship Education, in: Liebcap, G. (ed.) Advances 
in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Economic Growth, Amsterdam, 1-
38. 
Siegel, D.S., D. Waldman and A. Link (2003), Assessing the Impact of Organizational 
Practices on the Relative Productivity of University Technology Transfer Offices: An 
Exploratory Study, Research Policy 32, 27-48. 
Siegel, D.S., D.A. Waldman, L.E. Atwater and A.N. Link (2004), Toward a Model of the 
Effective Transfer of Scientific Knowledge from Academicians to Practitioners: 
Qualitative Evidence from the Commercialization of University Technologies, 
Journal of Engineering and Technology Management 21 (1-2), 115-142. 
Stephan, P.E., S. Gurmu, A.J. Sumell and G. Black (2006), Who’s Patenting in the 
University?, Economics of Innovation and New Technology 16 (2), 71-99. 
Thursby, J.G., A. Fuller and M.C. Thursby (2007), US Faculty Patenting: Inside and Outside 
the University, Research Policy 38, 14-25. 
Thursby, J.G. and M.C. Thursby (2002), Who Is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth 
in University Licensing, Management Science 48, 90-104. 
Zucker, L. G. and M. R. Darby (1996), Star Scientists and Institutional Transformation: 
Patterns of Invention and Innovation in the Formation of the Biotechnology Industry, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 93, 12709-12716. 
Zucker, L. G., M. R. Darby and J. S. Armstrong (2002), Commercializing Knowledge: 
University Science, Knowledge Capture, and Firm Performance in Biotechnology, 
Management Science 48, 138-153. 
 
 
